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INTRODUCTION
Gender makes a difference to many central 
questions in political philosophy: the way 
we understand the demands of distribu-
tive and relational justice, the ideal form of 
democracy, the division between the private 
and the public domains, and the normative 
issues raised by the acceleration of globaliza-
tion. We live in societies that are structured by 
gender in various ways: most obviously, we 
inherit a tradition of differential treatment of 
women and men, which bestowed numerous 
political, economic, and social privileges on 
the latter. The legal discrimination of women 
has been the main object of so-called first 
wave feminism. Pioneered by philosophers 
such as Wollstonecraft and Mill, feminists of 
the first wave have insisted on the illegitimacy 
of excluding women from political and eco-
nomic life and legally confining them to the 
private sphere of the family (or monastery). 
In many countries, women are still subject to 
legal discrimination, and therefore the aims 
of first-wave feminism continue to be highly 
relevant in some parts of the world.
Women who live in liberal democracies 
today have the same legal standing as men: 
for instance, they enjoy the same legal rights 
as men with respect to voting, standing for 
election, holding property and occupational 
freedom. Yet, they tend to be underrepre-
sented in politics—particularly at the top 
levels—in many professions that are consid-
ered traditionally male and from the higher 
end positions of most professions. They also 
tend to be more affected by poverty than 
men are and receive less pay; they are the 
victims of most rapes and domestic violence 
and do most of the housework and childrear-
ing—both in their homes and in commodi-
fied form. Finally, their bodies are objectified 
through pornography and commodified 
through prostitution to a much larger extent 
than men’s. Therefore, women appear to 
have a lesser share than men in political and 
social power, economic assets, and social rec-
ognition. The core belief of feminism is that 
people should not suffer disadvantage by 
dint of belonging to a particular gender, and 
therefore the earlier facts represent core con-
cerns for feminist political philosophy.
Indeed, current feminist political philoso-
phy offers a thorough analysis of all these 
issues and their ramifications. According to 
Jaggar’s (1983) helpful classification, feminist 
thinking comes in several varieties—liberal, 
socialist, and radical—reflecting the diversity 
of feminist authors’ value and methodological 
commitments. More recently added broad cat-
egories include ecofeminism and postcolonial 
feminism. Not all normative feminist thinking 
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is properly understood as a contribution to 
political theory which, traditionally, focuses 
on questions concerning the legitimate limits 
and uses of state power. Because it is restricted 
to political philosophy, this chapter mainly 
draws on work belonging to liberal and social-
ist feminism. By contrast, the traditions of rad-
ical feminism, ecofeminism, and postcolonial 
feminism are more obviously relevant to ethics 
and social philosophy, or else they contain sug-
gestions for political changes that are too radi-
cal to assess within the framework of liberal, 
egalitarian, and democratic states.
This chapter is also limited to a presenta-
tion of the contribution made by feminism to 
political philosophy at the most general level. 
It discusses the two main issues in contempo-
rary political philosophy: justice—comprising 
theories of fair distributions and of equal rela-
tionships between citizens—and democratic 
theory. Theories of justice and democratic 
theory are the two main areas of political phi-
losophy: the first is about substantial require-
ments of justice, and the second is about the 
procedures through which legitimate politi-
cal decisions can be reached. Gender plays a 
role in both, and, in particular, the gendered 
division of labor raises difficulties for main-
stream theories in both areas. The last section 
outlines new developments in feminist theory: 
explorations of the phenomena of implicit 
bias, and stereotype threat and thinking about 
epistemic injustice in the context of gender; I 
explain their potential import for theories of 
justice and democratic theories.
RELATIONAL IDENTITIES AND THE 
ETHICS OF CARE
Both in their professional and in their pri-
vate lives, women tend to carry most of the 
responsibilities of meeting other people’s 
needs: they are often the main caregivers 
for children, ill and disabled individuals, 
and the frail elderly. They are also often 
expected to take responsibility for main-
taining good relationships between friends, 
peers, and colleagues. All these are aspects 
of the gendered division of labor which, as 
I will show in the following sections, is the 
source of much political inequality between 
women and men (Okin, 1989a). unlike other 
 inequalities—resulting, for instance, from 
violence or outward discrimination—liberal 
political philosophy has difficulties identi-
fying the normative status of inequalities 
flowing from the gendered division of labor, 
because the individual choices that gener-
ate them are typically uncoerced. One of the 
main contributions of feminist philosophy 
over the past 30 years was to uncover the 
moral and political importance of caregiving. 
The general conclusion of this body of work 
is that the practical and emotional labor done 
by women as caregivers should be acknowl-
edged as essential to social cooperation and 
rewarded adequately.
First, on the moral importance of caring. 
Most generally, care is defined as the activity 
of meeting another person’s needs, whether 
material or emotional (Tronto, 1993). The 
majority of care ethicists follow Noddings 
(1982) in the belief that, to qualify as care, 
the activity in question must be hands-on 
(rather than, say, meeting someone’s needs 
indirectly, by paying someone else to provide 
necessary services). Others further restrict 
the definition to needs that cannot possibly 
be met by the person in need herself (Bubeck, 
1995). The moral value of meeting needs 
can be accounted for by major ethical tradi-
tions, yet direct reference to needs does not 
figure in the most influential test of assess-
ing individual moral development, devised 
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by the psychologist Kohlberg (1981). In the 
early-mid-1980s, the psychologist Gilligan 
made two important observations: first, that 
Kohlberg’s scale of moral development—
according to which reaching moral maturity 
depends on individuals’ ability to outgrow 
particular attachments to other people and 
to reason in terms of rights and duties—was 
developed using only male subjects. second, 
that women typically engaged in moral rea-
soning in which others’ needs and relation-
ships between people played a central role. 
The female, but not male, subjects of this 
research systematically tended to describe 
their identities as relational (Giligan, 1982, 
1995). Gilligan did not conclude that wom-
en’s absence from Kohlberg’s studies was 
inconsequential for his theory and that those 
female subjects who talked about needs and 
relationships were morally less developed 
than subjects able to reason in terms of rights 
and duties. Instead, she thought that in her 
conversation with girls and women she heard 
a different “moral voice,” one equally impor-
tant yet different from the moral “voice of 
justice” more familiar from men’s moral rea-
soning. she did not think—as some critics 
believe—that women and men are structur-
ally unable to speak both “moral languages” 
but merely noted the gendered aspect of 
moral reasoning, whatever their explana-
tion may be (Gilligan, 1995). At the time 
when Gilligan wrote her book, the topic of 
caregiving—that is, a large part of women’s 
traditional work—was absent from philoso-
phy. Gilligan’s work broke new ground in 
reevaluating the moral importance of care; 
following her, many feminists went on to 
explore “the ethics of care,” which has since 
evolved into a large body of moral and politi-
cal theory.
Much of it has to do with practices of 
caregiving within the family, mostly in 
childrearing. Ruddick (1989) argued that 
people who are primarily responsible for the 
hands-on tasks of childrearing—and whom 
she calls “mothers” whether they are female 
or male—confront three specific tasks: the 
physical preservation of the children; their 
physical, emotional, and intellectual devel-
opment; and their socialization into accept-
able members of their group. To accomplish 
these tasks successfully, mothers develop, 
ideally, a number of distinct virtues and the 
ability to address daily dilemmas involving 
the negotiation of conflicting needs as well as 
conflicts between the different tasks of chil-
drearing. she thought that the moral experi-
ence of mothers, and the specific virtues they 
develop can be a valuable resource in think-
ing about peaceful conflict resolution in the 
political realm. This idea has been further 
elaborated by Bubeck (1999). More specifi-
cally, Ruddick argued that “maternal think-
ing” identifies each individual as being, first 
and foremost, the result of someone’s loving 
work of care, thus providing a specific justi-
fication and motivation for pacifism. Others 
relied on the fact that everybody is “some 
mother’s child” (in Kittay’s words) to argue 
for a politics of responsibility; the thought is 
that we all have duties to support others in 
their caregiving activities because none of us 
could have survived and thrived without it 
(Kittay, 1999, engster, 2007).
Not only is our physical, intellectual, and 
emotional well-being the result of the care 
we received at the beginning of our lives, 
but also care is essential to our very iden-
tity as moral beings. held drew attention 
to the fact that the mothering activity is not 
merely reproductive, but a creative activity 
because “in bringing up children, those who 
mother create new human persons” (held, 
1997, 634). held describes the relationship 
between parents and children as a paradigm 
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case of moral relationships: it is, par excel-
lence, a situation in which the parents’ exer-
cise of power is voluntarily limited by moral 
reasons. This is the ideal context for a child 
to learn that might is not right and hence to 
get a grasp on the essence of morality (held, 
1993).
Other feminists looked beyond the realm 
of childrearing and noted that the moral 
development of adults also requires close 
relationships such as friendship (Friedman, 
1993). Yet others examined the importance 
of caring relationships for creating a climate 
of social trust, which in turn is necessary 
for working political communities and even 
more so for just institutions (Baier, 1994).
Beyond the differences in what they choose 
to emphasize, care ethicists convey the gen-
eral conclusion that care is necessary if we 
are to survive and develop into functioning 
and moral adults who together can run a just 
political community. Yet, this very important 
activity has often been seen as instrumental 
in keeping women out or on the margins 
of the public domain of politics and the 
economy, and for a long time failed to earn 
women the status of equal and fully partici-
pating citizens. echoing de Beauvoir’s (1949) 
famous claim that one becomes a woman by 
taking on the functions of reproduction and 
mothering, some contemporary philosophers 
warned that feminists should not embrace an 
ethics of care (Dietz, 1985, card, 1990). Part 
of the criticism to the ethics of care—that it is 
inherently parochial because it cannot account 
for duties owed to strangers with whom we 
have no caring relationship, nor the interest 
or hope to develop one—is easily addressed: 
some care ethicists have aimed from the very 
beginning to integrate the importance of care 
with that of justice (Tronto, 1993), and oth-
ers have revised or extended their theories in 
this sense (Noddings, 2002, held, 2006). It 
is more difficult to refute the criticism that 
an ethics of care is potentially oppressive, 
by glorifying the private, and ideally selfless 
activity of caregiving. Yet, care ethicists do 
not uphold the value for strategic reasons, 
but because they believe it is genuinely ethi-
cally essential. One way to avoid injustice 
to caregivers may be to directly compensate 
them—through various public policies—for 
the work of care they do (Okin, 1989a). The 
ideal way, however, is to encourage men to 
share equally in the work of care.
To bring men into care as full partners has 
been on the political feminist agenda at least 
since the late 1960s, and in spite of some 
degree of change it still sounds utopian.
Most care work is different from other 
types of work due to its emotional and per-
sonal element; for this reason, one cannot 
(typically) do it well if one does not wish to 
engage in care. having a relational self—gen-
uinely valuing connection to others—may in 
general be a necessary characteristic of a good 
caregiver. Feminist psychoanalysis offers 
an explanation of why women, rather than 
men, tend to take on caregiving: as babies 
and then small children we form ourselves in 
reaction to the parent who cares for us most 
of the time, that is the mother. Thus, female 
children find it easier to identify with their 
mothers and therefore form a relational self, 
while male children strive to separate from 
the mother (chodorow, 1978). On this view, 
the overburdening of women with care work 
and their ensuing social marginalization as 
well as their lack of social recognition and 
susceptibility to being dominated (Benjamin, 
1988) are rooted in the psychosexual rela-
tionships between women and men. The 
direct involvement of both women and men 
in the care for babies and infants holds the 
key to change; much of the action, therefore, 
is in the private sphere. But, as we shall see, 
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this does not mean that state involvement is 
unwarranted.
JUSTICE AND GENDER
Is state intervention in the private sphere 
legitimate, and in what form? how can we 
make sense of the gender component of dis-
tributional justice? how does gender affect 
other aspects of justice beyond the distribu-
tive one—how does gender figure in the 
problem of relational justice? I now turn to 
these questions.
The Public and The PrivaTe
Many of the problems mentioned in the 
introduction are at least partly caused by 
decisions made by individuals who interact 
with each other in the private sphere: women 
(living in liberal democracies) cannot be 
legally coerced to do housework and child-
care; yet they often make career decisions 
that lead to lower lifetime earnings than 
those of men, are more reluctant than men 
to engage in politics, or compete for pres-
tigious and powerful positions in various 
organizations and end up more often than 
men making a living out of pornography or 
prostitution. To the extent to which patterns 
of interaction are coerced—for instance, in 
cases when prostitution is embedded in mod-
ern forms of slavery, or in cases of domestic 
violence—they are obviously wrong, and 
easily addressed by liberal theories of justice. 
(Indeed, in such cases gender seems inciden-
tal, rather than essential, to the problem.) 
By contrast, when they result from freely 
made decisions of people interacting in their 
private capacity they raise difficulties to lib-
eral theories of justice. Traditionally, liberal 
thinking has been relying on a distinction 
between the public life of individuals, which 
is a legitimate subject to regulation, and their 
private life, which ought to be free from state 
intervention. Feminist philosophy challenges 
this foundational liberal belief.
The criticism mounted by Okin (1989a, 
1994) to Rawls’s theories of justice (1971, 
1993) on the question of justice in the family 
is the clearest expression of the difficulty that 
political–liberal theories of justice have with 
integrating feminist concerns. The family is a 
prime example of “the private.” Traditionally, 
the institution of the family has been par-
ticularly instrumental for keeping women 
outside political and economic life, social-
izing them into subordination and justify-
ing various forms of violence against them, 
including marital rape. An obvious feminist 
requirement then is that the family ought to 
be internally just in order to be legitimate. 
Yet, according to Rawls—who formulated 
the most influential account of liberal justice 
in contemporary philosophy—the justice of 
a society is determined by the justice of its 
basic structure, which is that society’s major 
political, economic, and social institutions. 
These institutions—rather than individual 
action or private associations such as the 
family—come under the purview of justice.
Rawls’s earlier thinking about justice—
before he moved on to defend political 
liberalism—is more amenable to feminist 
concerns. Okin (1989a, b) argued that gen-
der concerns are internal to the logic of 
Rawls’s early theory of justice (1971) in 
two distinct ways. First, she thought that, 
in order for the veil of ignorance—Rawls’s 
device for determining the principles of jus-
tice—to work in practice, individuals in the 
original position have to be able to exercise 
empathy as well as reason. Without a con-
cern for others, the process of deliberating 
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under the veil of ignorance would come to 
a standstill. As a consequence, she thought 
that Rawls’s theory should be modified to 
give up the requirement of mutual disin-
terestedness. Given the limited knowledge 
about the self that characterizes the parties 
in the original position, plus the fact that 
choices in the original position are sup-
posed to be made under the condition of 
uncertainty (the parties cannot attach prob-
abilities to particular outcomes), the require-
ment of mutual disinterestedness will make 
deliberation impossible. second, the family 
as the site of childrearing is the first school 
of justice. Individuals who choose princi-
ples of justice in the original position must 
be endowed with a sense of justice, which 
cannot be developed in the absence of the 
bonds of care that exist between parents 
and children and that go beyond parental 
duty. Therefore, a theory of justice needs to 
acknowledge the merits of care work and 
the necessity of caring relationships; in this 
sense, justice is rooted in care. But the bonds 
of care are not enough to ensure that chil-
dren acquire a sense of justice; for this, one 
also needs to be socialized in just families, in 
which the distribution of resources and bur-
dens between women and men is fair.
however, from the perspective of politi-
cal liberalism as defended in Rawls’s later 
thinking (Rawls, 1993), it is not clear in 
which way should the family respond to 
the requirements of justice. specifically, the 
earlier considerations about the importance 
of care and justice in the family are not suf-
ficient to show that the family should be 
internally regulated by justice (Okin, 1994, 
Lloyd, 1995). On the one hand, the family 
should be regarded as part of the basic struc-
ture of the society because, as the main site 
of childrearing, it obviously influences eve-
rybody’s life chances from the start. On the 
other hand, as voluntary associations, differ-
ent families legitimately reflect a variety of 
conceptions of the good, some of which may 
indeed be inimical to feminist values. The 
principles of justice are supposed to regu-
late the basic structure in order to ensure 
that the interaction among a society’s major 
political, economic, and social institutions is 
just. A safe conclusion is that, at a minimum, 
political liberalism will rule out families that 
deny women their basic freedoms. But this 
does not get close to the feminist aspira-
tion to see families shaped by internally just 
arrangements.
A current debate within political phi-
losophy concerns the question of whether 
individual actions should also come under 
the purview of justice. A positive answer 
will be friendlier to feminist goals (cohen, 
1997). But even some defenders of a nega-
tive answer take the side of Okin in consid-
ering it legitimate to regulate certain aspects 
of the family. Most prominent examples are 
regulating conditions of divorce, including 
financial settlements between breadwinners 
and homemakers and institutions concern-
ing childcare, which are meant to enable 
both women and men to compete for desir-
able social and economic positions (Neufeld, 
2009). The latter include flexible work-
ing hours for parents, parental rather than 
maternal leaves and subsidized childcare, all 
of which have a direct effect on the internal 
organization of the family. These proposals 
however fall short of addressing the riddle of 
how a theory of justice that relies on individ-
uals’ sense of justice could allow individuals 
to be socialized in internally unjust families.
If the family and, in general, the outcomes 
of private interactions ought to come under 
the purview of justice—either because justice 
concerns the internal organization of the fam-
ily as part of the basic structure, or because 
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justice concerns individual action—how can 
we assess them as gender just or unjust?
disTribuTive JusTice
Both the metric (resources in general, pri-
mary goods in particular, welfare, capabili-
ties, outcomes) and the principle (equality, 
sufficiency, priority) of distributive justice 
are contentious issues. This is reflected in the 
variety of accounts of gender justice.
some feminists such as Kittay (1999) fol-
low Rawls in the belief that primary goods 
are the correct metric of justice. Like Okin, 
she believes that Rawls’s theory of justice is 
amenable to a modification that would let 
it accommodate feminist concerns. Kittay 
notes that dependency is not the exception, 
but the norm of social life—we all are, at 
times, dependent on others’ care for survival. 
hence she criticizes the mutual disinterested-
ness of parties in the original position as a 
normatively unacceptable distortion of social 
life. According to Kittay, care is akin to a pri-
mary good: it is necessary for individuals to 
survive, let alone develop and pursue their 
idea of a good life. A proper understanding 
of social life represents individuals as nodes 
in a network of care, in which the burden 
of care renders those who carry it particu-
larly vulnerable and needy. Their vulnerabil-
ity results from the emotional charge of care 
and from the need to defer their own inter-
ests for the sake of meeting the needs of their 
charges. Informal caregiving does not carry 
economic rewards, and as a market serv-
ice care is underpaid (Tronto, 1993, 2002, 
Bubeck, 1995, Kittay, 1999). caregivers 
ought to be able to depend on people and 
structures that support them, and the sup-
port should be made available as a matter 
of justice. Kittay, and more recently engster 
(2007) took this account of dependency and 
care as a justification of the welfare state. 
Bubeck (1995, 1999), who came from a 
Marxist background concerned with avoid-
ing exploitation rather than from a Rawlsian 
distributive paradigm, gave an account of 
gender justice similar in its starting and end-
ing points. starting from the assumption of 
the universal dependency on care, she sug-
gested the creation of a state-run civil service 
of caregiving, which would be similar to, or 
even replace, the military service.
Kittay’s account may be read as an attempt 
to improve the justice of the basic structure 
by ensuring that the primary good of care is 
fairly distributed via the institutions of the 
welfare state, while Bubeck’s suggestion of 
a mandatory universal system of caregiving 
is obviously at odds with political liberal-
ism. But in both accounts gender plays an 
incidental, rather than constitutive role: they 
are accounts of gender justice only because 
caring is a highly feminized activity. Other 
philosophers consider directly the gendered 
aspect of typical distribuenda: opportunities, 
welfare, outcomes, capabilities. As already 
discussed, women fare worse with respect to 
at least some desirable social goods such as 
political and economic advantage.
Much contemporary thinking about dis-
tributive justice relies on the belief that it 
is unjust for people to be disadvantaged by 
factors that are not under their control and 
for which they cannot be held responsible. 
By contrast, different outcomes resulting 
from individual uncoerced and informed 
choices are just, as long as they reflect indi-
viduals’ level of talent and ambition (but for 
a defense of equality of outcomes, includ-
ing between women and men, see Phillips, 
2004). This is the difficult question, then: 
is there anything unjust in women’s lesser 
political participation and economic power 
if they result from women’s decision to 
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focus on childrearing and family making? 
some believe the answer is negative, that 
we should take women’s preferences for a 
particular combination of work and fam-
ily at face value and strive to accommodate 
them (hakim, 2000). Yet, in a world like 
ours, with a history of formal discrimina-
tion against women’s participation in poli-
tics and economic life, women’s domesticity 
is not likely to be a merely individual choice 
but rather a significant symptom and future 
cause of gender injustice (Williams, 2000). It 
is not all history. First, social institutions are 
structured such that it is difficult to combine 
work and family. second, ambition itself is 
socialized and so, to the extent that gender 
norms nudge women into domesticity, their 
lower political and economic ambition and 
unequal outcomes in these spheres ought 
to come under criticism (Arneson, 1998, 
Mason, 2000).
The likely conclusion of this debate is that 
gender justice is incompatible with gender 
norms. (An important question, which can-
not be addressed here, is whether all gender 
norms are incompatible with gender justice.) 
Arneson (1998) suggested that gender justice 
obtains when social practices and individual 
conduct are regulated such that gender does 
not affect one’s life prospects. According to 
Robeyns (2007) a society is gender just when 
women and men have the same capability 
sets, are free to choose without gender-re-
lated constraints on choice, and enjoy “pay-
offs” which are also unstructured by gender 
norms. Gheaus (2012) argued that a society 
is gender just only if the costs of leading a 
gender-neutral lifestyle are, for both women 
and men, lower than, or at most equal to, 
the costs of gendered lifestyles. costs in this 
context are to be understood very broadly, to 
cover financial burdens, time, effort, psycho-
logical discomfort, and so on.
relaTional JusTice
It is counterintuitive that all kinds of social 
injustice in general, and gender injustice in 
particular, are distributive in nature. some of 
it is relational, concerning how individuals 
relate to each other rather than how much 
each has compared to others. The demand 
that women’s work of care be socially rec-
ognized and rewarded is perhaps the most 
widespread concern of relational justice and 
gender.
But recognition is not all there is to rela-
tional justice. Young (1990) famously distin-
guished between several forms of injustice 
that do not fit naturally in the “distributive 
paradigm.” Together they explain, accord-
ing to her, how women are being oppressed 
and dominated. The “five faces of oppres-
sion” identified by Young are exploitation, 
marginalization, cultural imperialism, pow-
erlessness, and violence. Indeed, women’s 
oppression and domination are at least as 
salient concerns for feminists as unequal out-
comes in politics and the economy; haslanger 
(2000) has proposed that the very definition 
of “woman” incorporates this concern: “s is 
a woman iff (df) s is systematically subor-
dinated along some dimension (economic, 
political, legal, social, etc.), and s is ‘marked’ 
as a target for this treatment by observed or 
imagined bodily features presumed to be evi-
dence of a female’s biological role in repro-
duction” (haslanger, 2000, 39).
Yet, antifeminists may express skepticism 
about the very existence of gender oppression 
in liberal societies, pointing out that women 
are active perpetrators of various mecha-
nisms said to oppress them. cudd (2006), 
who takes the oppression of women by men 
to be the paradigmatic example of oppres-
sion, answers this potential criticism by 
pointing out that often the best overall pay 
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off for women in particular circumstances 
depends on their compliance with oppressive 
norms. A bigger worry with an account of 
gender justice in terms of oppression is that 
the same patriarchal gender norms that hurt 
women’s interests can also hurt, in other 
circumstances, men’s interests: for instance, 
they result in men being more vulnerable to 
extreme violence in the public space (particu-
larly in war) and in men having less access to 
family life (because there are no “daddy job 
tracks,” men are more likely to lose custody 
battles, etc.).
DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND GENDER
Relational equality is called by some political 
philosophers “democratic equality” to signal 
its importance for the well functioning of a 
democratic community (Anderson, 1999). 
This indicates that, alongside with living in 
a society whose institutions, individuals, and 
relationships are just, we also care about the 
way in which society is being shaped, namely, 
through democratic procedures. Feminists 
made distinct contributions to democratic 
theory by drawing attention to the impor-
tance of deliberative and communicative 
democracy in giving women power and voice 
and analyzing the way in which the gendered 
division of labor has systematically excluded 
women from democratic participation.
deliberaTive democracy
Benhabib’s work, influenced by critical the-
ory, focuses on the process of shaping par-
ticular social and institutional arrangements. 
On her account, norms of social coexistence 
are valid only if they are reached through a 
process of deliberation in which all affected 
parties participate under conditions of equal-
ity—that is, are equally enabled to voice their 
opinions on the issues at stake. Other condi-
tions necessary for the democratic process to 
lead to legitimate outcomes are that all par-
ticipants be equally able to bring new issues 
into discussion and challenge the very rules 
of how the deliberative process is conducted 
(Benhabib, 1996). This ideal of democracy 
goes hand in hand with Benhabib’s con-
ception of cultures as constantly changing 
through dialogue, as well as a conception of 
cosmopolitan multiculturalism that strives 
to combine diversity and robust equality. 
she argued that all citizens of multicultural 
societies ought to have the same civil, politi-
cal, and economic rights and should not be 
enrolled, against their will, in the culture of 
their parents. Rather, she claims that individ-
uals should retain an ability to exit it at any 
time (and the right to be accepted by other 
cultural groups if, for instance, they marry 
one of their members) (Benhabib, 2004).
Benhabib’s ideal of democratic society 
is feminist because it gives women a voice 
in every aspect of their lives and tries to 
delegitimize patriarchal practices without 
requiring women to repudiate their culture; 
instead, it indicates the conditions in which 
multiculturalism need not be bad for women 
(to appreciate the complexity of the debate 
on feminism and multiculturalism, see Okin 
et al., 1999).
Other feminists working on democracy, 
such as Young (1990), are less optimistic 
than Benhabib about women’s voice in poli-
tics, given their historical marginalization. 
Young’s solution to this problem is that dem-
ocratic practices should go beyond the delib-
erative—and hence rational—element and 
include forms of communication that have 
been traditionally practiced by women (such 
as storytelling). Another solution for making 
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democracies more women-friendly is intro-
ducing female quotas in politics (Phillips, 
1995).
The Gendered division of labor and 
democracy
The gendered division of labor is also 
important for understanding the role of 
gender in democratic theory. Pateman 
(1988) explained how the tradition of the 
social contract theory presupposes the 
existence of families: women’s work in the 
home makes possible the political activity 
of the polity’s members (male citizens, typi-
cally) by providing for their daily needs. 
Without such support, they would lack 
the time and resources needed to engage in 
politics; thus, the social contract between 
citizens requires a second, sexual—or mar-
riage—contract between women and men. 
One result is the exclusion of women from 
political participation. Pateman’s account is 
similar to Okin’s claim that “major contem-
porary Anglo-American theories of justice 
are to a great extent about men with wives 
at home” (Okin, 1989a, 110). But, while 
Okin’s main concern is with the require-
ments of justice in the context of a gendered 
division of labor, Pateman’s work focuses on 
women as citizens. unlike the first contract, 
the second went unrecognized by political 
philosophers, thus rendering women and 
their contribution to political life invisible. 
Pateman’s ultimate goal is to cast doubt 
that an organization of social life based 
on contracts between individuals can be 
an emancipatory strategy for women. As a 
consequence of her view, she became one of 
the main advocates of the introduction of 
a universal, unconditional basic income as 
a path toward women’s independence from 
men (Pateman, 2004).
POLICY AND FEMINIST THEORY
As already mentioned, feminist political phi-
losophers support a variety of policy propos-
als aimed at ensuring a fairer distribution 
of the burdens and benefits of social coop-
eration between women and men, and also 
at improving the relational status of women. 
Many of these proposals have to do with a bet-
ter distribution of care work, like the earlier 
mentioned civil service (Bubeck, 1999) and 
with the creation of safety nets for caregivers 
(Kittay, 1999). In other cases, the policy justi-
fication lies in enabling both women and men 
to engage equally in paid work and family 
life. As we have seen, the gendered division of 
labor is considered the source of distributive 
inequalities between women and men, lower 
recognition of women and their work, and 
women’s impaired citizenship. such policies 
could result in the generalization of a “car-
egiving parity” model of social organization 
which, according to Fraser (1994), would be 
better at addressing most of the concerns dis-
cussed earlier: it would help eliminate female 
poverty and income inequality, exploita-
tion, marginalization, and lack of recogni-
tion. A comprehensive policy proposal that 
would make it possible for women and men 
to engage in both paid work and family care 
was advanced by sociologists Gornick and 
Meyers (2003).
The next logical step for feminist demo-
cratic theory was to devise an understanding 
of citizenship that transcends the gendered 
division of labor and can therefore equally 
empower—perhaps in spite of Pateman’s 
skepticism—women and men. Building, 
among others, on the ethics of care and 
Bubeck’s proposal, Lister (2002) argued for 
a redefinition of citizenhood to include an 
obligation of caregiving. Lister thinks that 
an adequate understanding of citizenship 
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ought to include the private sphere and so 
her policy proposals partly overlap with 
those of Gornick and Meyers: employment 
regulations to allow parents to combine paid 
work and care, including parental leaves and 
childcare services. Other policy proposals 
are especially useful for including women as 
citizens on an equal standing to men, such as 
those concerning parliamentary design, pay 
and employment equity legislation, and the 
creation of adequate safety nets for women 
escaping domestic violence.
Another issue on which feminist political 
theory can directly feed into public policy is 
that of pornography. Pornography is a likely 
area that feminists would want regulated for 
its effects on women. some feminists believe 
that there is a direct causal connection between 
pornography and violence, including sexual 
violence, against women (MacKinnon, 1987). 
Others think that pornography is, in effect, a 
way of subordinating women because porno-
graphic images and words have the illocution-
ary force of communicating that women may 
be subject to degrading practices (Langton, 
1995). They may also silence women by con-
veying the idea that women’s explicit opposi-
tion to engage in sex (saying “no”) does not 
constitute a refusal (hornsby, 1995). If there 
are such causal connections—especially the 
more direct ones—they constitute reason 
for regulating pornography. Any all-things-
considered judgment would have to take into 
account powerful reasons to refrain from its 
criminalization: for instance, that this would 
deprive of choices women who do not have 
many choices in the first place (Nussbaum, 
1999).
Recently, there has been much philosophi-
cal interest in more radical policy proposals 
meant to improve the general distribution of 
wealth in society: the introduction of a uni-
versal, unconditional basic income, or a move 
toward property-owning democracy. Both 
proposals are very tempting to feminists since 
they would lift many women from poverty, 
empower all women economically, at least 
in the short run, and free them from oppres-
sive marriages and market demands, allow-
ing them to engage in caring (if they wish to) 
without the threat of economic dependency 
and poverty (elgarte, 2008). The introduc-
tion of an unconditional basic income could 
also lead to more recognition for care work 
and support people’s freedom to enjoy care 
in non-commodified form (Baker, 2008). Yet, 
the very last features are also potentially inimi-
cal to feminist goals because a basic income 
would serve as an incentive for some women 
to forgo careers and hence eventually regroup 
at the lower end of economic distributions 
(Robeyns, 2001, Gheaus, 2008). If a universal 
basic income or a property-owning democracy 
were to replace, rather than supplement, insti-
tutions such as (egalitarian) parental leaves and 
subsidized childcare, the detrimental effects on 
women would be larger (Bergmann, 2004).
GLOBAL JUSTICE AND GENDER
All the earlier concern domestic politics, but 
the acceleration of globalization is pressing 
new issues on the feminist agenda: duties to 
women living in nonliberal cultures, women’s 
migration and transnational employment, 
the revival of a culture of domestic servants, 
the global transformation of caregiving, and 
reproductive tourism.
One debate takes place between cosmo-
politan feminists and those who are more 
skeptic about the prospects of intercultural 
understanding. starting from her version of 
the capabilities approach rooted in a univer-
salistic account of human values, Nussbaum 
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(2000) argued that we ought to promote 
women’s capabilities independently from the 
cultures in which these women happen to live. 
Nussbaum’s project is to draw the attention of 
middle-class feminists from liberal democra-
cies to the plight of poor women from devel-
oping countries and explain why the liberal 
convictions of the first commit them to the 
goal of advancing the capabilities of the sec-
ond. Yet, where there are cultural barriers, it is 
not obvious that there exist legitimate means 
for doing this. Jaggar (2005) has argued that in 
order to create such means we must avoid the 
assumption that oppression by illiberal cul-
tures is the gravest injustice suffered by distant 
women. Material deprivation for instance—it-
self a feminized phenomenon—may be a much 
more salient injustice in many cases.
The international migration of women 
continues to provide cheap labor for domes-
tic services—primarily care services for chil-
dren, disabled, and elderly persons. The 
often exploitative employment conditions of 
migrant women came under feminist criticism 
(ehrenreich and hochschild, 2002). But, given 
that even in developed countries welfare states 
fail to provide sufficient care services, cheap 
migrant labor is often the only solution for 
enabling women to pursue a career. This gen-
erates dilemmas for feminists. some believe, 
for example, that feminist commitments to 
social justice are incompatible with relying on 
domestic servants (Tronto, 2002).
The feminization of migration in combina-
tion with the gendered division of labor has 
created shortages of care in migrants’ coun-
tries of origin. Because this phenomenon—
often referred to as “care drain” —happens 
against a background of stark global inequal-
ities, it represents an issue of global gender 
justice (Gheaus, 2013). care drain harms not 
only children and others in need of care but 
also parents who are physically separated 
from their children, often for many years 
(hochschild, 2005). An ideal solution to the 
problems of global care drain would be the 
creation of a global caring society such that 
adequate care is provided locally to all those 
who need it (Weir, 2005, Kittay, 2008).
Increased mobility across borders also ena-
bles well-off women to obtain cheaper repro-
ductive services using the labor of poorer 
women. Thus, women from the so-called third 
world countries increasingly serve as surro-
gate mothers to children who are then raised 
in richer countries. This expanding practice 
raises moral and political issues for all partici-
pants in the transaction: does using a surrogate 
necessarily exploit her? (Panitch, 2013) What 
are the conditions in which surrogate women 
can be said to make an autonomous choice 
to engage in surrogacy? Arguing that condi-
tions such as adequate income, education, and 
healthcare, as well as freedom from environ-
mental hazards and state violence are neces-
sary for autonomous decisions, Bailey (2011) 
concluded that oppression is often unavoid-
able in surrogacy contracts.
NEW FRONTIERS
Gender, imPliciT bias, and  
sTereoTyPe ThreaT
We have seen why gender raises a difficult 
problem—at least for liberal theories of 
 justice—when inequalities between women 
and men arise through free interaction. The 
liberal theory assumes that individuals could 
take full responsibility for such interactions. 
But what if free decisions are to a large extent 
driven by unconscious judgment and/or emo-
tional reactions? Psychological research indi-
cates that even people who hold explicit and 
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sincere egalitarian views make choices that 
reflect negative biases against women or racial 
minorities. (The best-known test measuring 
this is freely available at <https://implicit.
harvard.edu/implicit/>.) experiments show 
that both men and women evaluate differ-
ently vitas and job applications that are oth-
erwise identical depending on whether they 
are believed to be from men or from women. 
stereotype threat refers to people’s tendency 
to confirm negative stereotypical expectations 
that others have of them, especially in social 
contexts that make the stereotypes salient.
A growing body of literature explores the 
effect of stereotype threat and implicit bias 
for inequalities between women and men 
in academic philosophy (see, for instance, 
saul, 2013). But the possible application 
of these findings is much wider: some of 
the inequalities between women and men 
are likely to result from unconscious proc-
esses that characterize both the people who 
engage in competition for political and 
economic positions and those who are sup-
posed to evaluate the former. In this case, 
it is far from clear that individuals can be 
held fully responsible for their achieve-
ments (or lack thereof). This means that the 
“different conceptions of the good” can-
not be straightforwardly invoked to justify 
the feminization of certain jobs, women’s 
lower earnings, and other kinds of gen-
der inequalities. similarly, to the extent to 
which mechanisms to reduce implicit bias 
and stereotype threat are being discovered, 
there may be a strong case for their use in 
social practices and state institutions (such 
as, for instance, job interviews or courts).
Gender and ePisTemic inJusTice
According to Fricker (2007), epistemic injus-
tice is a distinct kind of injustice that harms 
individuals in their capacity as knowers; it 
arises when people are being wrongly treated 
as unreliable sources of information due to 
the hearers’ prejudice. epistemic injustice can 
be testimonial—for instance, when someone 
is not believed because she is a woman; or it 
can be hermeneutical, when insufficient col-
lective interpretive resources generates dis-
advantages—for instance, when a woman’s 
complaint that she has been the subject of 
sexual harassment cannot be made sense of 
in a linguistic community that lacks the con-
cept of sexual harassment.
epistemic injustice bears on most of the 
issues discussed in this chapter, including fair 
distributions, deliberative democracy, and 
women’s oppression. First, there is an inter-
esting question about the nature of the harms 
at stake in testimonial injustice. According to 
Fricker, the deepest harm of epistemic injus-
tice is preventing people to become who they 
really are, as knowers. so does the injus-
tice arise because we have a moral right to 
become who we are? And does the injustice 
have a distributional side: is there a right to 
become who you are as much as others do?
second, the existence of epistemic injus-
tice has direct implications for thinking 
about democracy, in particular its delibera-
tive component, since testimonial injustice 
can prevent some individuals from having 
an equal voice. similarly, it has consequences 
for thinking about domination and exploi-
tation, since having a voice is a main strat-
egy for avoiding these forms of injustice: if 
you suffer from persistent epistemic injus-
tice or from hermeneutical injustice, you 
are likely to be seriously disadvantaged in 
negotiations.
In conclusion, feminist political philosophy 
has been making distinctive contributions to 
the central issues of justice and democracy. 
Over the next years, it is likely that new 
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developments in our understanding of non-
conscious forms of discrimination and of 
nonconscious reactions to discrimination are 
likely to fuel debates about gender justice and 
about the relationship between gender and 
democratic exercises of power.
NOTE
1 I am thankful to sine Bagatur, Andrew Fiala, 
Lisa herzog, Lindsey Porter, and cristina 
Roadevin for comments on an earlier draft.
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